Two years ago, the concept of the franchise and transition designations in the NFL appeared to be outdated.

"Tagging" a player was one of the few rights given to a team in adjusting to free agency. It gave a general manager one chance a year to prevent his best free agent from leaving.

The concept was simple. You place the franchise tag on a player and he couldn't leave unless the raiding team surrendered two first-round draft choices. The less restrictive transition designation gave teams the ability to match an offer and keep the player.

	The Bills' use of the franchise tag with Peerless Price was beneficial to both parties.

Things got twisted through the years, but all of that was fine. It is business after all. Originally designed to help a team keep a starting quarterback or running back, the franchise tag soon started being used on punters or tight ends, too. In the month prior to free agency, teams would threaten a couple of players with the designations as leverage to get new contracts drawn up. Naturally, players were receptive to discussions with the hopes of eventually reaping big offers from other teams in free agency.

My biggest complaint was fixed with a minor adjustment. What bugged me was the wasted time from the start of free agency until July 15. The Jason Taylor-Dolphins situation of 2001 was particularly silly. Taylor was within an hour of getting a longterm contract on the eve of free agency. The paperwork didn't get into the league office by the deadline, so each side had to wait until July 15 to eventually resurrect the deal. Any team that signs a franchise or transition player to a longterm deal from the start of free agency to July 15 loses the ability to tag players for the length of the longterm deal.

Wisely, the NFL and the Players Association put a 15-day window into the start of free agency to promote longterm contracts. If a team gets a longterm deal before Thursday for a franchise or transition player, it gets the franchise or transition tag back for next year. That's fair. So if Orlando Pace of the Rams, Walter Jones of the Seahawks, Chris McAlister of the Ravens, Tebucky Jones of the Patriots, Donovin Darius of the Jaguars and Todd Sauerbrun of the Panthers don't get longterm deals by Friday, their negotiations quiet down until July.

But, two weeks into free agency, market prices are set, and each side had opportunities to evaluate where the values of players at different positions are going. The big money is spent on free agency during the first two weeks. It's fair.

What intrigues me most about the future of franchise and transition tags is the growing complexities because of the escalating prices of the top players in the sport. As it was this year and it will be for the future, "tagging" a player is no longer simple. Old standards can't be applied to the present, and each case on each team has to be taken individually.

The three most pronounced examples this offseason involved two players who were tagged -- Peerless Price in Buffalo and Takeo Spikes in Cincinnati -- and one who wasn't -- David Boston in Arizona.

The franchising of Price was pure brilliance by general manager Tom Donahoe. From the start, the Bills knew they couldn't afford to keep Price and rebuild their defense. With the acquisition of Drew Bledsoe last year along with having high-priced offensive players Eric Moulds, Ruben Brown and Mike Williams, the Bills couldn't afford to pay Price more than $3 million a year and still have enough money left over to spend on defense.

Donahoe franchised Price, which caught him off guard at first. Being a smart businessman, Donahoe let Price shop around quickly to determine his market. Atlanta was interested and was willing to pay him $5 million a year. The Falcons and Bills danced the trade-talk dance and eventually settled on the Falcons trading the Bills their first-round choice.

The Bills signed Spikes after Cincinnati declined to match Buffalo's offer sheet. The Bills had enough money to make a bid for defensive tackle Sam Adams. They had the 23rd pick in the draft. For receiving help, they had the money to sign Kevin Dyson, Bobby Shaw, Curtis Conway or whoever else might appeal to their offense. Brilliant.

Underappreciated is the smart, mature maneuvering of the new Bengals regime. A transition tag for Spikes, their best player? At first, everyone thought they were crazy. Wrong. They were smart. A franchise tag would have been totally restrictive. Unlike the Price situation, a Spikes trade for value would have been tough to do in 15 days because there are so many good linebackers available. Certainly the Bills, who didn't have a first-round choice before the Price trade, weren't going to give up their second for Spikes and have no draft.

Look at the linebacking options available -- Rosevelt Colvin, Mike Peterson, Shawn Barber, Kevin Hardy, Chris Claiborne and others. At receiver, there was a big dropoff after Boston and Price. It shows in the salaries coming in. No receiver in free agency has gotten more than $2.5 million a year after Boston and Price were taken from the market. Conversely, linebackers are signing for $3 million and $4 million a year daily.

Second-guessers might argue that the Bengals might have gotten value for Spikes, but that would be unrealistic. Remember, had the Bengals franchised Spikes and not traded him by Thursday, he wouldn't have signed a longterm deal and negotiations with the Bengals would have been frozen until training camp and beyond.

	Lewis

Give Marvin Lewis and team president Mike Brown a lot of credit. The transition tag was the perfect solution. Lewis had time to learn his team, study tape of Spikes and make value judgments on team needs. Brown would have automatically matched in the past, but the new Bengals regime has more dialogue. In the end, Spikes was happy because he got a six-year, $32 million contract and a one-way ticket out of Cincinnati.

Lewis had a chance to rebuild a team with players who wanted to be in Cincinnati. He has signed four new starters -- defensive linemen John Thornton and Carl Powell, middle linebacker Kevin Hardy and cornerback Tory James.

"We spent our money on players who have been in championship games, and their leadership is needed in our lockerroom," Lewis said. "You've seen how winning players such as Bill Romanowski and Jerry Rice helped the Raiders with their work ethic and leadership. I need leaders here."

Then there is the Arizona Cardinals. Not franchising Boston was stupid. Owner Bill Bidwell was reluctant to commit a one-year, $5 million tender to Boston because of fears of how immature he was during the 2002 offseason. Boston is clearly one of top four or five receivers in the game, and one of the league's most exciting offensive talents. And he's young.

The better business move would have been a copy of what happened in Buffalo. Franchise Boston and trade him. It would have given coach Dave McGinnis an extra first-round choice or even a second-rounder to start replacing the lost talent in Arizona. Unfortunately, for a good coach such as McGinnis, the Boston decision and the low offer to Jake Plummer have created a desert in the desert. They should have franchised Boston.

In the future, you will see more tough decisions involving franchise-caliber players. Pace asked for $24 million to sign a longterm deal with the Rams. Walter Jones wants a $7 million a year, Jonathan Ogden-type deal from the Seahawks. Eventually, teams will determine they can't give $20 million guarantees to franchise players and trade them and sign a less expensive replacement.

But that's a natural process. When franchise players become more valuable than an owner's original investment for the franchise, each decision about a franchise player becomes more businesslike.

John Clayton is a senior writer for ESPN.com.