It may be nothing more than a negotiating tactic, a warning shot fired in the general direction of the Players Association.
But ploy or not, the whispers are getting louder and louder -- baseball is talking about contraction, the elimination of two teams.
Tellingly, commissioner Bud Selig refuses to categorically rule out such a drastic measure.
"What I've said relative to contraction is the problems are so significant that every option is on the table," Selig said.
Just as the drive for a salary cap represented the key issue for owners in 1994-95, revenue sharing figures to be the central point of these talks. Owners know implementing a cap is hopeless, and revenue sharing may be the only avenue to eliminate the competitive imbalance Selig is always talking about.
Baseball's biggest image problem is the realization that many teams begin each season with no reasonable hope of competing for the playoffs.
The inclusion of some mid-level and low-level payroll teams in the last postseason (White Sox, A's, Giants) hasn't fooled anyone, particularly Selig. The game is mostly dominated by a half-dozen clubs that win the most pennants and sign the marquee players, both foreign and domestic.
While popular perception is that baseball's sorry labor history is the result of the distrustful relationship between players and owners, that's only partly true. What's really driven the impasses has been the intrasquad fighting between owners.
And what's propelled the players to one victory after another -- in the courtroom and at the negotiating table -- has been their unanimity. Owners have never had this. As a matter of fact, they've never been more divided than they are presently.
That's led some owners to question the whole concept of revenue sharing.
Last year, 13 teams received payouts, led by the Montreal Expos, who received $24 million. Minnesota got $20 million. Milwaukee and Florida were given $15 million. Pittsburgh and Philadelphia were next with $12 million. Anaheim was given $8 million.
In the eyes of some (mostly big-market owners), there are two problems with the concept of revenue sharing.
First, some don't like the current method of determining who receives assistance. Why are the Anaheim Angels, 40 miles south of the second-biggest city in the country and owned by Disney, getting some assistance?
For that matter, what makes Philadelphia -- the nation's sixth-biggest metropolitan area -- eligible? Why have the White Sox, based in the third-largest city, been thought of as "small market"?
Worse, for some, is how the money is being utilized. While the Twins took in some $20 million in aid, they spent less than $17 million on payroll. (To be fair, the Twins have been on something of a spending spree since the start of last season, signing pitchers Brad Radke and Eric Milton to long-term deals).
Why, owners wonder, should we be subsidizing clubs which only take the assistance and use it to turn a profit? Why should Twins owner Carl Pohlad, one of the handful of richest individuals in the game, be given financial help of any kind?
Incredibly, there's no stipulation that forces teams who receive revenue sharing to put the money into baseball operations. If the Twins had put the money accrued over the last few years toward a new facility, they'd be that much closer to moving into the new stadium that the club insists is critical to their survival.
Then there's the issue of TV rights fees. Under the new agreement signed with Fox last season, teams stand to take in nearly $20 million annually. A team like the Twins, then, can expect $40 million in revenue before a single ticket is sold.
Of course, many of the "small-market" teams aren't TV attractions at all, with rosters full of young (read: inexpensive) and unknown players. The Expos, Twins and Royals aren't getting a lot of Game of the Week exposure, but they're getting the same check from the network as the Yankees, Mets, Braves and Red Sox.
Some large-market owners are doing the math. If teams like the Twins and Expos are being paid $40 million annually and doing little to invest in their franchise or enhance the game, maybe it would be cheaper to buy them out altogether.
While expensive in the short-term -- it would probably cost a minimum of $150 million to buy out a team -- it would have a number of long-term benefits.
First, it would rid the sport of a few franchises which seem either unable or uninterested in being competitive and go a long way toward improving the overall quality of the game.
Second, it would tighten the job market by eliminating anywhere from 50 to 100 roster spots and theoretically, help depress salaries. If baseball is driven by supply and demand -- this isn't always true, as teams routinely overpay free agents in the face of little or no competition -- then it stands to reason that more players competing for fewer jobs means lower salaries. Again, the operative word here is "theoretically."
Finally, it would eliminate baseball's relocation headache. The Twins and Expos have nowhere to go. They can't get funding or support for new facilities in their present markets, and having expanded twice (four teams) in the last decade, baseball has run out of viable markets.
The two best relocation markets in terms of demographics and population base are San Jose and northern Virginia. Both, however, come under the domain of existing teams. The Giants claim San Jose, while the Baltimore Orioles do the same with northern Virginia.
Finding more than two clubs beyond the textbook examples of the Twins and Expos, however, may be difficult. The A's have stadium troubles, too, but it would be difficult to argue for dissolution of a team which came within a game of unseating the two-time defending champions in the playoffs and one which has marshalled its modest resources as well as the A's.
Pittsburgh and Milwaukee are opening new ballparks this season, taking them off the endangered species list. And Selig, the longtime owner of the Brewers, would hardly let Milwaukee get axed, even though it is the majors' smallest market. Kansas City, too, is an option, but the area has supported baseball in the past, and some want to see what comes of the new ownership and management teams there.
Naturally, any real movement toward contraction would invite an insurrection by the Players Association. For now, executive director Donald Fehr refuses to take the talk as anything more than a thinly disguised scare tactic.
"Players are not likely to respond well to such an effort being used as a threat or a club," Fehr said recently.
No doubt, such a move would result in legal challenges. Fehr and Co. could well show the math and argue that the Twins and Expos could compete and even thrive if they merely put to use the resources they've been given.
All the talk may be mere posturing, and the whispers may never get any louder. But it's getting harder and harder to ignore it for now.
Howe on shaky ground?
In each of the last two seasons, Art Howe has received strong support in balloting for the AL Manager of the Year. His Oakland A's forced the New York Yankees to an elimination game in October, the first to do so since Cleveland beat the Yankees in the 1997 Division Series.
But if the A's start slowly, Howe could be the first manager fired.
Howe won few friends with his aggressive stance in contract extension talks earlier this month. He demanded a two-year extension, before finally settling for one.
Howe's tactical blunder was reminiscent of the mistake made by Kevin Kennedy following the 1995 season. Kennedy had led the Red Sox to the AL East title, the team's first postseason appearance since 1990.
But when contract extension talks stalled, Kennedy took his displeasure public, figuring he had the support to do so after reaching the playoffs.
The move outraged CEO John Harrington, who nearly ordered Kennedy fired for the breach of etiquette. GM Dan Duquette intervened on Kennedy's behalf, only to fire the manager himself 10 months later.
Howe's support is relatively thin in some areas of the Oakland organization. There's a feeling on the part of some that the A's would be better off with bench coach Ken Macha at the helm.
It's not that Howe is considered a bad manager. But neither is he much responsible for the A's being where they are. The team is largely home-grown, augmented by some shrewd acquisitions by GM Billy Beane and his staff.
Howe is hardly irreplaceable, as he may find out if the A's stumble at the start of the season.
Sean McAdam of the Providence Journal writes a major-league notebook each week during the baseball season for ESPN.com.
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